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Abstract
Successful missions in the field often rely upon communication technologies for tactics and coordination. One middleware used in securing these communication channels is Data Distribution Service (DDS) which employs a publish-subscribe model.
However, researchers have found several security vulnerabilities in DDS implementations. DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C) is a security layer implemented into DDS to
mitigate impersonation attacks using Kerberos authentication and ticketing. Even
with the addition of DDS-C, the real-time message sending of DDS also needs to be
upheld. This paper extends our previous work to analyze DDS-C’s impact on performance in a use case implementation. The use case covers an artificial intelligence
(AI) scenario that connects edge sensors across a commercial network. Specifically,
it characterizes how DDS-C performs between unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), the
cloud, and video streams for facial recognition. The experiments send a set number
of video frames over the network using DDS to be processed by AI and displayed
on a screen. An evaluation of network traffic using DDS-C revealed that it was not
statistically significant compared to DDS for the majority of the configuration runs.
The results demonstrate that DDS-C provides security benefits without significantly
hindering the overall performance.
Keywords Kerberos · DDS · Cyclone DDS · UAV · AI · QoS

1 Introduction
Networked sensor devices typically follow the paradigm where one node tasks
and receives input from multiple Internet of Things (IoT) devices. For example, a command node sends operational messages and receives sensor data from
* Andrew T. Park
andrew.park075@gmail.com
Extended author information available on the last page of the article
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multiple unmanned aerial vehicles to conduct a search and rescue operation.
These messages, ranging from simple commands to video frames, could have
Quality of Service (QoS) attributes such as retransmitting unreceived messages to
ensure nodes that joined late or have re-started receive all messages. For example,
a unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) requires specific messages to navigate search
and rescue missions correctly in lossy environments. Remotely operated bases
use forward-deployed UAVs to support battlespace surveillance in contested environments [1]. The inter-communication links between UAVs and external links
to cloud support services need to be robust enough to send and process video and
images given terrain diversity and secure enough to thwart adversary attacks [2,
3]. Other messages could have QoS as best effort when a system can handle not
receiving every message. For example, artificial intelligence (AI) facial recognition software on an IoT device may not require all frames from a live video feed
to detect entities correctly. These use cases are essential in understanding DDSCerberus’s (DDS-C) impact on real-world operations.
Data Distribution Service (DDS) is an open-source middleware that has been
used in many sectors like finance, healthcare, and the military [4]. For real-time
communication, DDS messages do not need to include the intended recipient but
have a topic, represented as a unique string, from publisher to subscriber. The
subscribers receive messages based on the associated topic. The messages have
QoS properties to determine the sender and messages’ behavior. Despite its efficient and real-time message sending capabilities, DDS is prone to impersonation
attacks which allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to messages [5–7].
DDS-C, a security layer for DDS, handles the authentication of DDS participants using Kerberos tickets [8–10]. This authentication mitigates impersonation
attacks by verifying the identity of authenticated participants. This research’s
experiment captures network traffic from DDS and DDS-C to assess if DDS-C
significantly impacts regular DDS performance. It uses the Bright Apps cloud
architecture and network layout to evaluate DDS-C [11].
The experiment testbed relies on Cyclone DDS (an implementation of the DDS
Standard) and the a commercial network infrastructure. The goal is to demonstrate that DDS-C is mature enough to support commercial artificial intelligence
(AI) applications, specifically evaluating the impact on transmitting video frames.
This impact is quantified by capturing total network traffic. The experiment emulates a network of UAVs with Raspberry Pi devices that send video frames. In
conjunction with Bright Apps, this experiment aims to support UAV deployment
in the field with DDS-C, such as in search and rescue. There are three use-cases
detailing real-world scenarios for Bright Apps network infrastructure applications. To address the three use-cases, the experiment has one network configuration whose goal is to send video frames processed by AI over a Virtual Private
Network (VPN). The network setup consists of a Raspberry Pi device, Elastic
Compute Cloud (EC2), and laptop personal computer (PC). First, the Raspberry
Pi device sends video frames to the EC2 for facial recognition AI processing, and
then the PC displays the processed frames. The same message types of interest
are selected. The QoS of interest is best effort to mimic use case scenarios. The
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data collected are categorized by equipment to determine the traffic impact on
each device.
This research builds on the previous paper, Park et al.’s Quantifying DDS-Cerberus Network Control Overhead, by collecting network packet quantities for facial
recognition streams [10]. The collected traffic is split into three categories: data
message, security, and discovery+. The research determines if DDS-C security traffic has a significant impact on the other DDS traffic by comparing the three through
statistical analysis. This paper aims to contribute to other DDS research in use case
applications.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines DDS, DDS-C, and related
works. Section 3 contains the experiment setup, assumptions and limitations, and
results. Section 4 provides future research recommendations.

2 Background
This section provides background information on the design and implementation
of DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C) by explaining Data Distribution Service (DDS) and
Kerberos. Additionally, it presents other similar application works that support the
development of this research’s experiment.
2.1 DDS‑cerberus (DDS‑C)
DDS-C is a security layer that mitigates impersonation attacks [8–10]. It is integrated into DDS to provide participant authentication through Kerberos.
DDS is managed by Object Management Group (OMG) and is open-source,
allowing for several implementations from different vendors. Its primary function
is to handle message delivery between communicating entities. The communication
is done through topics, or unique strings, that are sent by publishers and received by
subscribers. Subscribers receive a message by specifying a unique string a message
has. Quality of Service (QoS) policies dictate publisher and subscriber behavior on
how to send messages. The policies are adapted to different network setups, such as
having subscribers only read the most recent message.
The research focuses on the Data-Centric Publish-Subscribe (DCPS) layer containing the following components: publishers, subscribers, and domain participants.
The components are seen in Fig. 1 where domain participants can contain any number of publishers and subscribers. The messages are sent with topics to the DDS
domain to be read by subscribers. Previous DDS-C research focused on authenticating publisher and subscriber nodes, but this experiment focuses on authenticating domain participants. Two reasons to use domain participants are adding and
authenticating nodes becomes less of a hassle, and they allow for easy integration
into the Bright Apps architecture. Domain participants assist with executing publishers and subscribers in parallel, which helps send multiple video frames.
Kerberos is an authentication protocol used on distributed networks to authenticate users or nodes who request to talk on the network [12]. Kerberos servers have
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Fig. 1  DCPS layout [8]

a realm name that is used to specify where the authentication is taking place. The
|kinit| command grants tickets with the correct principal, or username, realm, and
password. When the command runs, the requesting device or node communicates
with Kerberos’s Key Distribution Center (KDC), which has two main components:
the Authentication Server (AS) and Ticket Granting Server (TGS). The requester
authenticates with the AS if their credentials are in the server. If credentials match,
the authenticated can gain a ticket from the TGS by sending a Ticket Granting Ticket
(TGT) given by the AS. The lifetime of a ticket is default of 24 hours, but it is possible to change the lifetime to add ticket security.
One important function of Kerberos that DDS-C leverages are keytabs, long-term
keys to aid in creating tickets. Each domain participant in DDS is paired with a
unique keytab for seamless authentication. These keytabs are encrypted using AES256. When running the |kinit| command, the password has to be manually entered;
however, manually typing the password is not required if run with passing in the
long-term key. This authentication is important in mitigating impersonation attacks
because if the attacker does not have access to the keytab, DDS-C does not allow
them to impersonate a node or domain participant [5–7]. For example, an attacker
is able to get on the same network and deploys a rogue node to communicate with
other nodes. However, DDS-C authenticates this rogue node by enforcing Kerberos
authentication, and since the attacker does not have the correct credentials, it is not
able to communicate on the network. The attacker would have to either replicate or
steal the long-term key, which would be difficult due to the key’s encryption and
additional network security. There are multiple methods to enforce authentication
to mitigate impersonation attacks. In this experiment, the domain participants individually handle their own authentication. Another variation would be to implement
a DDS-C node to act as a firewall or switch facilitating authenticated nodes. The
attacker would have to either replicate or steal the long-term key, which would be
difficult due to the key’s encryption and additional network security.
Figure 2 shows these keytabs in action with a sequence diagram of two domain
participants, DP1 and DP2, authenticating with a KDC. The leftmost gray area,
“Domain Participants utilizing KDC,” represents the keytabs that were created and
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Fig. 2  DDS-C authentication process with domain participants [10]

stored for DP1 and DP2. DP1 contains one publisher, and DP2 contains one subscriber. Messages flow as follows:
A. DP1 Authentication:
(0) DP1 requests to authenticate and starts the process to receive a ticket using
a keytab. The AS receives DP1’s request.
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(1) The AS sends a message back that DP1 is able to authenticate.
(2) DP1 sends its keytab to the AS.
(3) The AS sends a TGT and its shared key for TGS after authenticating DP1.
The shared key is used by the domain participant to encrypt messages for
the TGS.
(4) DP1 sends the TGT and message request to the TGS to get a ticket.
(5) The TGS grants a ticket to DP1.
B. DP1 Authenticated:
(6) Afterward, DP1 is successfully authenticated, and the publisher can send
its messages to the DDS domain.
C. DP2 Authentication:
(7) DP2 requests to authenticate and starts the process to receive a ticket using
a keytab. The AS receives DP2’s request.
(8) The AS sends a message back that DP2 is able to authenticate.
(9) DP2 sends its keytab to the AS.
(10) The AS sends a TGT and its shared key for TGS after authenticating DP2.
The shared key is used by the domain participant to encrypt messages for
the TGS.
(11) DP2 sends the TGT and message request to the TGS to get a ticket.
(12) The TGS grants a ticket to DP2.
D. DP2 Authenticated:
(13) Afterward, DP2 is successfully authenticated, and the subscriber can
read messages. In this case, it would be reading data sent from DP1’s
publisher.
E. Subsequent Messages:
(14) Since DP1 and DP2 authenticated, no further authentication is needed.
DP1’s publisher sends Message i with Topic.
(15) DP2’s subscriber receives the Message i.
(16) DP1’s publisher sends Message i + 1 with Topic.
(17) DP2’s subscriber receives the Message i + 1.
DDS-C authentication executes at the beginning of a domain participant’s lifecycle; however, this authentication can run more than once based on an administrator’s needs. Additionally, this can be performed in conjunction with shorter ticket
lifespans. This research does not integrate these scenarios with the experiment and
is possibly integrated into future work.

13

Distribution of DDS‑cerberus authenticated facial recognition…

2.2 Related use case applications
DDS-C’s application and use cases are inspired by search and rescue and battlefield operations. Many papers provide solutions to these complex problems, but this
research focuses on those that offer solutions using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).
Understanding the other researchers’ proposed designs and experiments helps craft
the experiment use cases and real-world application.
The first paper to inspire the experiment design was Munir et al.’s research on proposing FogSurv, a fog-assisted architecture to be used in urban areas for real-time surveillance using artificial intelligence (AI) [13]. They constructed a centralized cloud
server with fog nodes to offload communication and computation power burdens. Their
use cases mention battlefield applications for security and control, which this paper’s
research does on a more specific scale with DDS-C. The experiment has two scenarios
with an Internet of Things (IoT) device where in the first scenario, it offloads tasks to a
fog node and the second where it offloads it to the cloud server. They measure latency
in different experiment runs with data fusion and AI. The results revealed that offloading to a fog node is 37% more efficient than to the cloud. The use cases and design for
broad low-power surveillance helped motivate DDS-C use case research.
In 2017, Ribeiro et al. conducted simulated and physical experiments with UAVs
and DDS [14]. They also used a cloud architecture but focused on using a DDS communication infrastructure. They designed a two-layer UAV network for UAVs closer
to the ground and those far away from the ground. They selected sensors ranging from
those that work near the ground to those far away. The types of sensors on the UAV categorized what layer it would operate in. The simulated experiments tested different network links for low bandwidth and lossy environments in wired and wirelessly configurations. They tested with both QoS best effort and reliable and found more throughput
with reliable QoS acknowledgments. The physical experiment only utilized one UAV
with ROS (Robot Operating System) for DDS communication with a base station on
the cloud. They observed high signal attenuation and loss of connectivity since they
used default DDS QoS policies. For future work, they plan to extend the experiment to
four UAVs.
ROS is a middleware with two versions: ROS 1 and ROS 2. The difference is that
ROS 2 uses DDS for real-time communication. In 2019, Sandoval and Thulasiraman’s
research goal was to use simulated experiments to test ROS 2’s ability to protect against
cyber attacks for UAV communication [15]. This work was to help support the integration of ROS 2 into the US Navy’s UAV swarms. Since ROS 1 was still in use for Naval
UAV control, they simulated an environment where ROS 1 and ROS 2 were connected
with a bridge to control three UAVs. The first two UAVs were susceptible to rogue
node attacks, unwanted disabling and landing, due to ROS 1, but the third UAV used
the bridge with ROS 2 and its security plugins to prevent these attacks. Even though the
plugins mitigated the attacks, there was significant latency overhead due to the bridge
setup. This work contributes to DDS-C by highlighting the need for node authentication when controlling UAVs.
Table 1 lists the three related works that relate to DDS-C design and experiments
regarding AI, network environments, and security. The following experiment combines
these three elements to measure DDS-C’s performance in a cloud-based network.
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Table 1  Use case applications
Paper

Description

Munir et al. [13]

Utilizing fog-assisted architecture for real-time surveillance.

Ribeiro et al. [14]

Evaluated DDS communications with using a two-layer UAV network.

Sandoval and Thulasiraman [15] Simulating cyber attacks against UAVs over ROS 1 and ROS 2.

3 Experiments
The goal of the experiment is to analyze and determine if DDS-Cerberus’s (DDSC) addition to Data Distribution Service (DDS) operations significantly impacts the
real-time message sending performance of DDS in addition to the artificial intelligence (AI) processing. The experiment mimics use case scenarios such as search
and rescue where DDS-C, DDS, and AI would benefit security, processing, and performance. These experiments are performed in conjunction with Bright Apps, aiming to integrate their Azoth AI with these particular missions. This section goes over
the experiment details, apparatus, assumptions and limitations, and results.
3.1 Experiment details
Bright Apps developed Azoth AI with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for facial
recognition in real-world use cases like search and rescue [11]. Azoth AI provides
AI and machine learning (ML) capabilities while disconnected from networks in
degraded environments using low computing power resources which is applicable to
this experiment’s use of Raspberry Pi devices. It uses existing OpenCV capabilities
for ubiquitous object recognition. The long-term goal is to create and train a neural network for more specific image recognition. It is paired with Cyclone DDS, a
variation of DDS developed by the Eclipse Foundation, to send live video frames in
lossy environments to be processed by Azoth AI [16, 17]. Cyclone DDS is related to
ROS 2 (Robot Operating System) because it is a tier-1 ROS 2 Middleware Interface
(RMW). It uses a python binding which helps integrate DDS-C and the AI [18].
Bright Apps uses UAVs connected to and controlled by Raspberry Pi devices. These
devices communicate with Amazon Web Services (AWS) Elastic Compute Cloud
(EC2) instances for facial recognition processing by Azoth AI [19]. This configuration is to mimic operations where UAVs send live video feeds. OpenVPN connects
this framework by providing additional security and network maintenance [20].
DDS-C authenticates domain participants to allow for multiple node executions.
Integrating it with Bright Apps technology is still in development, and this research
presents initial work in this integration with a real-world commercial network infrastructure. The experiment’s results aim to support this paper’s previous experiment
results and if DDS-C authentication traffic adds negligible latency overhead to affect
normal DDS message traffic significantly.
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Table 2  Equipment specifications
Raspberry Pi: Cyclone DDS Laptop PC: Cyclone DDS, KDC EC2: Cyclone DDS,
KDC
Name

Cyclone1

Cyclone2

KerAzoth

Machine

Raspberry Pi 4B

XPS 13 9310

t3.2xlarge [21]

OS

Ubuntu 20.04.3 LTS

Ubuntu 20.04.3 LTS

Ubuntu 20.04.3 LTS

CPU

ARM Cortex-A72

11th Gen i7-1185G7

Intel Xeon E5-2676 v3

Disk Space

64 GB

2 TB

58 GB

RAM

8 GB

31 GB

32 GB

Fig. 3  Experiment Network Diagram

3.2 Experiment apparatus
The experiment testbed for DDS-C uses Cyclone DDS and Kerberos. There are
three pieces of apparatus-one Raspberry Pi 4B device, a Dell XPS 13 laptop personal computer (PC), and one EC2 instance. These labels distinguish the three
pieces of equipment: Cyclone1, Cyclone2, and KerAzoth. Table 2 lists the main
equipment and its specifications. All devices have Kerberos installed. Additionally, to communicate with each other, Cyclone1 and Cyclone2 are OpenVPN
clients, and KerAzoth is the OpenVPN server; all traffic routes through KerAzoth from the other two. KerAzoth is located in the AWS region code us-west-2a
within Oregon. Figure 3 is this equipment’s testbed network diagram. All components are connected wirelessly through OpenVPN and use Cyclone DDS to
communicate.
Cyclone1’s domain participants authenticate with KerAzoth’s Key Distribution Center (KDC) before sending messages. Similarly, KerAzoth’s domain
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participants authenticate with Cyclone2’s KDC. Cyclone1 represents the UAV
with Raspberry Pi device, Cyclone2 represents command and control (C2), and
KerAzoth represents a network bridge and AI processing.
This experiment covers three main use cases that encompass the apparatus
used in the commercial network infrastructure.
• Use case 1: Perform DDS-C authentication on a Raspberry Pi device and EC2,

and after authentication, both devices communicate using Cyclone DDS. This
tests communication from a Raspberry Pi device to an EC2 on the cloud.
• Use case 2: Authenticate using DDS-C over a Virtual Private Network (VPN).
OpenVPN clients utilize unique credentials to communicate with the OpenVPN
server. This tests communication using a VPN between devices and the cloud.
• Use case 3: Send a video feed to be processed by AI for face recognition. The
video feed is sent over DDS with compressed video frames. These frames are
sent with best effort reliability Quality of Service (QoS) to handle lossy environments. This tests sending video frames over DDS for AI processing.
There is one network configuration to encompass these three use cases. It is run with
QoS best effort to mimic real-world UAV use when sending video frames. Only one
UAV is used to set a baseline for future experimentation with more UAVs.
• Cyclone with KerAzoth: All domain participants authenticate either with

Cyclone2 and KerAzoth when starting up. Cyclone1 sends compressed video
frames to KerAzoth for AI processing, and when finished, KerAzoth sends the
processed frames to Cyclone2.

The domain participants authenticate using Kerberos through enforcement of DDSC. Authentication prevents impersonation attacks by adding an extra security layer
that the domain participants use outside of DDS. They also authenticate the publishers and subscribers they have. After the domain participants receive their ticket,
they can send messages. The administrator can configure the ticket’s time-to-live to
determine if the domain participants need to be re-authenticated.

Fig. 4  Experiment node layout
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Table 3  Experiment participants
Set 1
Cyclone1
Cyclone2
KerAzoth

Set 2

Set 3

Set 4

Set 5

Set 6

Domain participants

1

1

1

1

1

1

Nodes (Pub/Sub)

1

2

3

4

5

6

Domain participants

1

1

1

1

1

1

Nodes (Pub/Sub)

1

1

1

1

1

1

Domain participants

1

2

3

4

5

6

Nodes (Pub/Sub)

2

4

6

8

10

12

The scalability goal of Cyclone with KerAzoth is to increment the number of
domain participants in KerAzoth to increase DDS-C authentication traffic and highlight the use of Azoth AI. Figure 4 and Table 3 illustrate how the configuration participants are set up and how the frames are passed. The number of participants was
chosen based on the network diagram with one UAV as an initial proof of concept
and execution of the use cases. Future experiments can extend the participant count
to greater numbers to further determine DDS-C’s impact. Figure 4 illustrates Set 1
from the table. Cyclone1’s domain participant has one publisher in the figure but
increases, as seen in the table, by one publisher as each set is tested to handle video
frame publishing. KerAzoth’s publisher and subscriber node count also increases
based on the experimented set. KerAzoth has one publisher to one subscriber
increasing with subsequent runs: 1:1, 2:2, 3:3, 4:4, 5:5, 6:6. Each of these ratios has
a unique domain participant. Cyclone2’s one subscriber with one domain participant does not increase in number, and it receives all AI processed video frames to
display on the laptop PC screen.
Cyclone1’s publishers send 100 messages with frames as data to Cyclone2. The
frames are sent with the Real-Time Publish-Subscribe (RTPS) protocol and are
not encrypted to allow for constant User Datagram Protocol (UDP) connections.
Although encryption is not enabled to focus on this experiment’s concept, performance, and function, future experiments can enable DDS Security to utilize encryption such as AES and Diffie-Hellman key exchange [22]. Figure 4’s Publisher1 sends
a frame with a topic, and as more publishers are added to Cyclone1, they send different frames with unique topics. These frames are compressed and then fragmented
when sent over the network. The subscribers in KerAzoth receive these topics. Subscriber1 receives Topic1 and applies facial recognition AI to the frame by using rectangles to identify any faces. Other subscribers would be waiting for their respective
topics. Afterward, Publisher2 sends the processed video frame with Topic2 to Subscriber2. In this case, the publishers in KerAzoth send the processed video frame
with a topic that only Cyclone2’s subscriber uses.
To incorporate the AI, the configuration was designed to parallelize AI processing with domain participants. With the number of messages set to 100 for every
experiment iteration, the messages were divided up so each publisher in Cyclone1
sends a unique frame to the subscriber in Cyclone2. For example, Table 3’s Set 2 has
two publishers in Cyclone1’s domain participant. One publisher would publish only
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odd frames and the other even frames. For subsequent Sets, the frames are divided
by every third or every fourth frame for the newly added publishers. This parallel
processing is an important aspect of this network configuration to showcase Azoth
AI while also increasing participant count for DDS-C authentication.
On all three pieces of equipment, tcpdump captured the experiment’s data and
was sent to a separate Windows machine to be processed [23]. The data are first
run with Windows Powershell scripts involving tshark, a Wireshark filtering tool
[24, 25]. Afterward, the Student’s t-test is used to calculate the p-value to analyze
the results with a 𝛼 of 0.05 to conclude if the null hypothesis is rejected. In these
experiments, since the population variance is unknown it is appropriate to use the
Student’s t-test for the p-values. The tools used are Python and SciPy [26, 27].
Since the population variance is unknown, this test is applicable to the population
of DDS use cases discussed in this paper. Table 4 lists all the software mentioned
for the experiment.

3.3 Assumptions and limitations
These are the experiment’s assumptions and limitations to execute the specified
network setup. The assumptions are as follows:
• Domain participants do not fail authentication and that an attacker does not

compromise them.

• Cyclone1’s publishers send all 100 video frames, and KerAzoth’s subscribers

receive the specified messages.

• Keytabs were not renewed or changed between experiment runs.
• Relevant packet protocols such as RTPS and Kerberos (KRB5) were selected.

Protocols such as Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP) were excluded
because they did not contribute to any of the three traffic categories in analyzing
DDS-C.

Table 4  Software information
Name

Version

Location

Cyclone DDS

0.8.1

Cyclone1, Cyclone2, KerAzoth

OpenVPN

2.4.7

Cyclone1, Cyclone2, KerAzoth

Kerberos

V5

Cyclone1, Cyclone2, KerAzoth

tcpdump

4.9.3

Cyclone1, Cyclone2, KerAzoth

tshark

3.4.7

Windows

PowerShell

5.1.19041.1237

Windows

Python

3.9.7

Cyclone1, Cyclone2, KerAzoth, Windows

SciPy

1.7.0

Windows
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• All RTPS packets without the video frame payload were categorized as discov-

ery+.

• Azoth AI detected only one human face during experimentation. Other experi-

ments may incorporate more faces to analyze the AI’s processing load on the
EC2.

The limitations are as follows:
• The experiment is only performed with the us-west-2a zone. If other zones were

used, the experiment may differ with a lossier environment.

• RTPS messages containing video frames were fragmented, resulting in more

packet traffic.

• The experiment only experimented with reliability QoS of best effort. Best effort

fits the use cases; however, future experimentation could include other QoS policies.
• Collecting the total packet traffic is only one factor in determining DDS-C’s
impact on DDS. Other factors could include latency and location of equipment.
The appartus in this experiment were in the same immediate area while the EC2
was not.
• The default discovery protocols were used. The discovery+ traffic could differ if
other discovery protocols were invoked.
3.4 Experiment results
The data are organized based on the three used equipment as seen in Fig. 5 for
Cyclone1 and Cyclone2 and Fig. 6 for KerAzoth. The figures use the three data
categories: data message, security, and discovery+ traffic. The figures’ independent variable uses the total number of domain participants for each participant set
in Table 3, and the dependent variable is based on the traffic amount for each data
category. The security traffic bytes in the experiment are indistinguishable compared
to the greater data message and discovery+ traffic.
Table 5 shows the p-values for all three equipment. Overall, the quantity of
participants was not statistically significant; however, for seven participants, two
cases were statistically significant for Cyclone2 and KerAzoth. The network and

Table 5  Configuration p-values

Participants

Cyclone1

Cyclone2

KerAzoth

3

0.911

0.888

0.785

4

0.9

0.77

0.751

5

0.09

0.114

0.8

6

0.946

0.905

0.899

7

0.315

0.002 1

0.0031

8

0.234

0.82

0.8

Statistically significant p-values with 𝛼 0.05

1
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Fig. 5  Experiment results. Left column: Cyclone1. Right column: Cyclone2

experiment setup could have influenced this situation. The experiment setup and best
effort QoS use resulted in a more lossy environment and no packet retransmissions.
The use of an EC2 brings possible unreliability with its network. With the addition
of using a VPN, the sent video frames could be lost over the network. Cyclone1 did
not have a statistically significant p-value because it is the starting point for all message traffic by sending captured video frames; only the components receiving the
messages were affected. Even though the p-values were statistically significant, the
results reveal that choosing the correct network and equipment setup is important in
ensuring all components function as intended. Also, the other participant p-values
show that this significance is uncommon and that DDS-C’s additional security traffic did not impose a statistically significant change in the overall traffic. Instead, the
Cyclone DDS and network setup contributed to this change.
Figure 5 and 6’s data message traffic for all three components show no dramatic change overall because Cyclone1 sends out 100 video frames regardless of
participant count. Cyclone1 and Cyclone2 send traffic through KerAzoth’s OpenVPN server; therefore, the average traffic of both Cyclone1 and Cyclone2 should
be roughly equal to KerAzoth’s. For Cyclone1 and Cyclone2 the average is around
7,509 KB, which doubled is 15,018 KB. This byte average is roughly equal to KerAzoth’s data message traffic’s byte average of 15,028 KB. The figures’ security traffic
is consistent with participants and their DDS-C authentication. Cyclone1 has only
one domain participant to authenticate; therefore, overall traffic has no substantial
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Fig. 6  Experiment results for
KerAzoth

change. Cyclone2 and KerAzoth’s domain participant count increases for each
experiment run, resulting in increased authentication and a strong positive linear
correlation. Due to the consistent participant counts, all three components’ discovery+ traffic have positive linear correlations.
The experiment results show that DDS-C’s security overhead is not statistically
significant enough to hinder normal DDS operations with sending video frames.
Using DDS-C in a real-world environment with architecture similar to Bright Apps
will benefit DDS security and expand its integration in more use cases.

4 Conclusion
This research experimented DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C) with use cases around
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), the cloud, and video streams. The background
on Data Distribution Service (DDS), Kerberos, and related works on UAV-related
papers culminated into the three use cases. The experiment tested these use cases
by connecting devices through a Virtual Private Network (VPN) and used DDS-C
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to authenticate domain participants. The experiment’s configuration emulated use
cases for real-world operations such as using UAVs for search and rescue. It used
Cyclone DDS as its testbed where the nodes in the domain participants deal with
sending and receiving video frames, emulating UAVs sending their video feeds for
artificial intelligence (AI) processing. The Quality of Service (QoS) used was best
effort to mimic an operational environment where some frames are not needed for
the facial recognition AI. To analyze the collected traffic from the configuration, the
packets were divided into three message categories: data message, security, and discovery+ traffic. The security traffic quantity was low enough to not be statistically
significant for the majority of the configuration runs. The results show that the mean
traffic from DDS-C overhead is insignificant when constant video frames are sent
over the network. The experiment shows that DDS-C applied to other DDS implementations or even in conjunction with other software adds security benefits without
hindering overall performance.
Future work would incorporate middleware handling multiple Internet of Things
(IoT) devices for integration into real-time systems. The node authentication provided by DDS-C would be beneficial for search and rescue and battlefield operations. Future research aims to integrate the experiment setup with multiple UAVs
and more diverse AI to build up deep neural networks for object recognition. Additionally, as DDS-C evolves with better functionality and features, future work could
also include experimenting with cyber attacks against it. These future work ideas
could develop, extend, and add to the use cases in this paper.
Governments, companies, and people are looking to improve existing technologies through future works. DDS-C is still in development and requires more
real-world experimentation before operational use to improve DDS security and
development.
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